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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the ownership and control of British firms using recent tech-
niques from computational graph theory. Specifically, we analyze the ‘small-world’ of ownership
and control. A small-world is a network whose actors are linked by a short chain of acquain-
tances (short path-lengths), but at the same time have a strongly overlapping circle of friends
(high clustering). We simulate a set of corporate worlds using an ensemble of random-graphs
introduced by Chung and Lu (2002a,b). We find that the corporate governance network struc-
tures analyzed here are more clustered (‘clubby’) than would be predicted by the random-graph
model. Path-lengths, though, are generally not shorter than expected. In addition, we inves-
tigate the role of financial institutions: potentially important conduits creating connectivity
in corporate networks. We find such institutions give rise to systematically different network
topologies.
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1 Introduction
Social network analysis is a critical methodology for analyzing the inter-relationships between
actors (e.g. Burt (1992), Wasserman and Faust (1994)). Recent advances in computational graph
theory have opened up exciting new techniques for investigating complex network structures in
diverse disciplines such as sociology, economics, physics, the life-sciences and organizational studies
(Newman (2003), Jackson (2005)). In this paper we use techniques introduced by Newman et al.
(2001) and more recently Chung and Lu (2002a,b); Chung et al. (2003) to provide a social network
analysis of the ownership and control of publicly traded UK firms. This paper extends our previous
network evaluation of corporate boards (Conyon and Muldoon (2006)).
We contribute to the extant social network, strategy and corporate governance literature in
two distinct ways. First, we argue that contemporary developments in graph theory are capable
of providing deep insights into the structure of social networks in organizational settings. We
illustrate this by presenting a social network analysis of the governance of publicly traded firms (i.e.
the ownership and control of firms). Specifically, we discuss important concepts such as ‘bipartite
graphs’ , ‘small-world’ models, and ‘random-graphs’ and show how they can be profitably applied
to the analysis of corporate governance phenomenon.1 Second, we present empirical evidence on
actual ownership and control (board) networks. Using data on a large set of publicly traded UK
firms in year 2000, we test whether observed ownership and control networks can be characterized as
a ‘small-world’. Our research builds upon prior small-world studies in organizational and business
settings. Specifically, we use the methods of Newman et al. (2001) and the family of random graphs
recently introduced by Chung and Lu (2002b,a); Chung et al. (2003).
Our research context is the governance of publicly traded firms, sometimes referred to as ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ enterprises. There are two distinctive features of such firms in the United States and the
United Kingdom. First, ownership is diffuse such that many different shareholders each own only
a small fraction of the firm’s equity and second, de facto control of the firm resides with the CEO
and the board of directors.2 The social network approach offered here contrasts with the canonical
1Each of these ideas is explained fully in Section 3. For example, one can informally think of a bipartite graph as a
social network consisting of two distinct types of actors. Here we discuss two kinds of bipartite graph: an ‘ownership’
network, which consists of firms and their shareholders, and a ‘control’ network, which consists of boards and their
directors.
2See Franks et al. (2005) for an analysis of the evolution of ownership in the United Kingdom. Useem (1984)
provides a sociological account of the inner circle of boards and directors.
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agency model which focuses on the ownership and control of a single firm without reference to its
connections to other organizations. The separation of ownership from control gives rise to an agency
problem: the CEO can potentially engage in opportunistic self-serving activities. Tirole (2005) gives
an excellent account of the corporate finance approach to the classic principal-agent problem. The
history of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance since Berle and Means (1932) has centered on how
to resolve this agency problem. In consequence, the design of compensation contracts, monitoring
by independent directors or the discipline imposed by an active takeover market have been widely
studied. However, this representation of the firm is incomplete. Firms are not independent islands
in a sea of economic activity. Instead, firms are intrinsically connected to each other: a given firm
typically shares a common owner or board member with at least one other firm. These ties are
sufficient to connect firms together in a giant network. Such connectivity, we argue, has significant
implications. The presence of short path-lengths and high clustering promotes the rapid diffusion
of knowledge, information, ideas and even business practices throughout the corporate network (see
Cowan and Jonard, 2004).
Our paper is motivated, in part, by a famous study by Stanley Milgram who suggested that
the social world of the USA is ‘small’ in the sense that most pairs of Americans are connected by
a rather short chain of acquaintance (around six intermediates)—see Milgram (1967). This is true
even though (a) most Americans are acquainted with only a tiny fraction of the country’s population
and (b) circles of acquaintance tend to be strongly overlapping—that is, one’s friends have a
tendency to be friends in their own right. In the last decade or so scholars from diverse disciplines,
including physics, sociology and economics, have become very interested in this phenomenon and
have sought to understand how it arises. An important strand of this work is the exploration of
various ensembles of random graphs (see Newman et al., 2001; Chung and Lu, 2002a,b; Chung
et al., 2003). In our study we are interested in the application of these principles to the social
network of British ownership and control.
A small-world, then, is a network whose actors are linked by a short chain of acquaintances, but
at the same time have a strongly overlapping circle of friends. These two distinctive properties, the
coexistence of short path lengths and a high degree of local clustering, constitute the small-world
phenomenon. This immediately prompts the question ‘small compared to what’? In response, there
has been considerable effort in the graph theory literature to develop a sensible and tractable answer
to this question. Broadly speaking, the answer is to compare the observed data to some suitably
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assembled ensemble (collection) of random graphs. Early work made comparisons with so-called
Poisson random graphs introduced by Erdo˝s and Re´nyi (1959). Indeed, important contributions
to the small-world of corporate governance literature by Kogut and Walker (2001) and Davis, Yoo
and Baker (2003) did precisely this. However, it is now known that social networks have particular
structural properties (for example, directors automatically know each other by virtue of sitting on
the same board) that makes the comparison to the Poisson graph inappropriate. Consequently,
more recent efforts have used graph ensembles designed to capture more features of the social
network.
In an important paper Newman, Strogatz and Watts (2001) examined affiliation networks which
recognize that the network of corporate governance has a bipartite structure. That is, the network
has two distinct kinds of actors, for example, boards and the directors who sit on them. One of the
consequences of this structure is that one should automatically expect a high degree of clustering
among directors; after all, as noted above, the directors who sit on a given board know each other.
The main accomplishment of Newman et al. (2001) is to provide numerical predictions of the small-
world statistics that one can derive from an appropriately assembled random corporate universe.
It is these expected values of the path length and clustering coefficient that form a legitimate
benchmark to compare actual data against.
However, their methods yield only mean estimates of the small-world statistics and provide
little guidance as to other properties of the distribution, such as the variance of clustering and path
lengths. Our contribution in this paper is to consider a slightly different collection of random graphs
introduced by Fan Chung and Linyuan Lu (see Chung and Lu, 2002a,b; Chung et al., 2003). This
family of random graphs have two attractive properties: first, they are more tractable analytically
and second lend themselves readily to numerical simulation. This latter property means that the
researcher is able to simulate as many hundreds of corporate universes as desired and so examine
the entire distribution of the small-world statistics. In our paper, we do precisely this. The research
question we ask has the flavor of a hypothesis test: is the real corporate universe similar to, or
different from, a randomly assembled business world? Newman et al. (2001, 2002) suggested that
the corporate elite was rather close, in a certain distributional sense, to a random one. If this really
is the case, then the world is actually no smaller than one would expect by chance. We extend
this research by focusing on the family of random graphs introduced by Chung and Lu (2002a,b);
Chung et al. (2003).
4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we show that the ownership and
control of firms can be characterized as a bipartite graph. We provide concrete examples to show
this. In Section 3 we describe germane aspects of small-world theory. Our focus is on the class of
models introduced by Chung and Lu (2002a,b); Chung et al. (2003) and how they may be applied
to the corporate governance social network. In Section 4 we describe the British data to be used
in this study. We present the results and deduce that the world is, indeed, ‘small’, but only in the
sense that the corporate world appears more clustered than expected. Path-lengths, however, are
no smaller than expected, even though they form a very small fraction of the available vertices in
the network. The innovation here is that we provide an appropriate benchmark, based on Chung-Lu
random graphs, to evaluate the significance of smallness. In addition, we analyze the importance of
financial institutions in the network. It is often argued that banks are important conduits creating
connectivity in corporate networks. We demonstrate that the presence of financial institutions
does indeed give rise to different network topologies. Finally in Section 5 we offer some concluding
remarks.
2 Social networks of ownership and control
2.1 Motivation
Our concern in this paper is to analyze the ownership and control of the Anglo-Saxon enterprise
using the tools of contemporary social network analysis. We focus on the type of firm that is
publicly-traded on stock exchanges in economies like the United States and the United Kingdom.
Such firms, as is well-known, are characterized by diffuse ownership in the sense that a myriad
different shareholders each own only a small fraction of the firm’s equity. In addition, the firm is
controlled by a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the board of directors. Importantly, the firm’s
owner (shareholder) does not make strategic decisions about the firm’ assets. Instead, the task of
running the firm is delegated to a separate body (the CEO and board of directors) giving rise to a
de facto separation between ownership and control.
The theoretical lens typically used by economists to analyze such situations is the principal-
agent model. In this context the principal would be the shareholder and the agent would be the
CEO.3 The divorce between ownership and control implies that the principal (shareholder) cedes
3The principal-agent paradigm covers any hierarchical task-delegated relationship. For example, the relation
5
the task of running the firm to an agent (the CEO). The mere fact of this delegation suggests that
the agent may have access to private information that is not similarly available to the principal.
For example, the shareholder may not know with certainty the true skills and quality of the CEO
when he or she is initially appointed. Alternatively, the shareholder may not be able to perfectly
know whether the CEO is taking the right actions to safeguard the owner’s asset. For example,
the CEO may be taking unwarranted perks in the form of excessive pay or empire-building. Each
of these problems arises because of the private knowledge of the agent.4 A primary concern of the
principal-agent literature has been how to design an optimal contract in order to resolve the tensions
between the principal and agent arising from such natural asymmetries of information. There is a
vast literature on this. For example, a central research theme in agency theory centers on how to
design an optimal compensation contract to align the interests of CEOs with owners. Such models
typically predict the use of stock options, bonus payments or profit sharing as a potential solution.
Alternative mechanisms to alleviate the costs associated with the separation of ownership and
control include monitoring activities. The firm might appoint auditors, establish audit committees
and hold regular audits to establish the veracity of corporate accounts for example.
Whilst the agency perspective provides important insights into the relationships between actors
in an economy it is not the only way to model such interactions. Our conjecture in this paper
is that the principal-agent representation of the nexus of ownership and control relationships is
incomplete. It is incomplete in the sense that the models are generally applied to information
asymmetries arising in a single context. For example, how to solve the shirking (moral hazard)
problem between a manager-worker in a single firm. Or how a shareholder can motivate the CEO
in a single firm. The focus of attention is not, in general, on the connections that might arise
between the whole network of firms. In short, most of the important features the agency model
can be articulated in a single hierarchical relation between a single principal and a single agent.5
Interconnections between firms are ignored. However, firms are not independent islands in a sea
of economic activity. Instead, they are connected to each other in important ways. For example,
between manager and worker, landlord and tenant, client firm and its advisor, and insurance company and a car-
driver or a home-owner and a building contractor etc.
4The literature has distinguished between moral hazard and adverse selection problems. For instance, a moral-
hazard occurs if the actions taken by the agent are hidden from the principal (e.g. the owner cannot observe perfectly
the CEOs effort or his diligence in selecting projects). Adverse-selection occurs when the agent’s true type is hidden
from the principal (e.g. the owner does not know the true skills embodied in the CEO).
5Extensions to the model are possible, for example to a principal multi-agent framework. But even here the focus
remains on the design of the optimal contract rather than the importance of connections in the network structure.
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Figure 1: The Network Structure of Ownership and Control : The top half is a bipartite graph.
Vertices labeled A to K can represent either company directors or the firm’s shareholders. Vertices
1 to 4 represent either the board of directors or the firm. The bottom half shows the projections:
the board/firm projection is to the left and the director/ownership projection is to the right.
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a given firm typically shares a common owner with at least one other firm. In addition, the same
firm might share a common board member with another firm. Or indeed, it might share a common
advisor such as a compensation consultant or audit company with another firm. These ties are
sufficient to connect firms together in a giant complex network. Such connectivity, we conjecture,
will have significant implications for firm strategy. For example, the presence of short path-lengths
in the network and/or a high degree of clustering may promote the rapid diffusion of knowledge,
information, ideas and even business practices throughout the corporate network (see Cowan and
Jonard, 2004).
2.2 Corporate governance relations as bipartite graphs
An important feature of our paper is the representation of the interconnections between actors in
the corporate governance system as bipartite graphs. To understand this we first need to introduce
some necessary terminology. A graph or network is a set of items termed vertices (sometimes also
called nodes) and edges. The vertex is the fundamental unit of a network and an edge is a link
connecting two vertices. Two vertices are adjacent if connected by an edge. The number of edges
connected to (or incident on) a vertex is called the degree and is a local measure of the vertex’s
centrality in the graph. A vertex’s connected component is that part of the graph consisting of the
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vertex itself and all those others that can be reached by paths running along the edges. A geodesic
is a shortest path6 (in the sense of traversing the fewest edges) that connects two vertices and
finally, the distance between two vertices is the number of edges in a geodesic connecting them.
We are now in a position to represent many corporate governance relationships as a bipartite
graph. To be concrete, a bipartite graph is one whose vertices can be divided into two distinct
sets and whose edges connect only unlike kinds of vertices. Consider how one might represent the
owners of a firm and the firm itself as a such a bipartite graph. There are two sets of vertices:
the first set are the firms themselves and the second set are the owners of the firm. Figure 1
illustrates such a bipartite graph and its projections. In the upper-half of the figure the two sets of
vertices are displayed horizontally. Vertices {1, 2, 3, 4} represents firms and vertices {A,B, ..., J,K}
represent shareholders. An edge exists between X and Y if a shareholder owns at least on share
in a given publicly traded firm. Notice that the edges run between the two sets of vertices. The
bipartite graphs gives rise to two distinct projections. These two separate graphs are drawn in
the lower half of Figure 1 and are ‘projections’ of the bipartite graph onto one of its two sets of
vertices. One might call these the ‘ownership projection’ and the ‘firm projection’. In Section 3
we calculate small-world statistics for each of these projections.7 This procedure for understanding
the relation between different sets of actors in a social network is quite general. The set of vertices
X = {1, 2, 3, 4} can represent a firm and vertices Y = {A,B, ..., J,K} represent directors. In this
case an edge exists between the two vertices of a director is the member of the board.
To illustrate the bipartite representation of ownership and control consider the two companies
in Table 1: Marks and Spencer Plc. (a high-street retailer) and Standard Chartered Plc. (a bank).8
Suppose we are interested in the firms’ boards and directors. The two firms can be represented like
the vertices in the upper-half of Figure 1 and the directors like the vertices in the lower-half. Marks
and Spencer Plc. and Standard Chartered Plc. are linked since they share a common director: Sir
Ralph Robins, who is a non-executive (outside) director at each firm. Table 1, though, is only a
partial representation of the links between firms generated by shared board members. The final
column is a dummy variable indicating whether the board member has at least one additional
director appointment. Marks and Spencer Plc. is connected to Standard Chartered Plc. via Sir
Ralph Robins, but is also connected to other listed firms (not shown) since Dame Stella Rimington,
6A pair of vertices may be connected by several paths that share the shortest length.
7Specifically, path lengths (L) and clustering coefficients (C) for each projection separately.
8The data refer to year 2000.
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J K Lomax, and I P Sedgwick also hold additional directorships at other firms.9
In a similar fashion we could examine the ownership structure of the two firms. This is il-
lustrated in Table 2. Under UK corporate law, ownership stakes exceeding 3% are reported and
can be observed by the researcher. We therefore list all owners (who are not board members)
with share stakes exceeding this critical threshold. Table 2 illustrates that Marks and Spencer has
two such owners, while Standard Chartered has four. In the case of Marks and Spencer the two
largest shareholders own about 10.2% of the company and the four largest shareholders in Standard
Chartered own about 25%. There is not a single controlling block holder in either case—this is
consistent with the Anglo-Saxon model that ownership is diffuse with each shareholder typically
owning a small fraction of the firm’s common equity.10 The two example firms are not linked by
a common shareholder. However, the final column is the number of listed companies in which the
named shareholder has a share stake exceeding 3%. For example, the Prudential Corporation owns
about 4.7% of Standard Chartered. In addition, it owns at least 3% share stakes in 136 other
publicly listed UK firms. In Section 4 we document the general pattern of ownership.
3 The small-world model
The small-world theory analyzed in this paper is described in Newman et al. (2001) and Jackson
(2005). We can now describe two main properties that characterize a “small world”, namely the
notions of mean path length and clustering.
The first property of the small-world model is short mean path-lengths. That is, randomly-
chosen pairs of vertices turn out to be unexpectedly close to each other. A graph with N vertices
contains N(N − 1)/2 unordered pairs of vertices. If these are numbered 1, 2, . . . , N and di,j is the







In our numerical work we compute L from a complete list of the di,j , found using Johnson’s All-
9Of the 29 board members listed in Table 1, 10 hold director appointments at other publicly listed firms.
10The case of Standard Chartered is slightly anomalous in this respect. Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat was Singapore’s
wealthiest man, until his death in 2004. His fortune was derived from share ownership in British bank Standard
Chartered, which he bought up in the 1980s.
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Table 1: The Board of Directors
Company name Name Role ‘Interlock’
Marks and Spencer Plc. L Vandevelde Exec
Marks and Spencer Plc. R W C Colvill Exec Yes
Marks and Spencer Plc. A McWalter Exec
Marks and Spencer Plc. D Norgrove Exec
Marks and Spencer Plc. A Ball Non-Exec
Marks and Spencer Plc. Sir Michael Perry CBE Non-Exec Yes
Marks and Spencer Plc. Dame Stella Rimington DCB Non-Exec
Marks and Spencer Plc. Sir David Sieff Non-Exec
Marks and Spencer Plc. B F Baldock CBE Non-Exec
Marks and Spencer Plc. Sir Ralph Robins Non-Exec Yes
Marks and Spencer Plc. J K Lomax Non-Exec Yes
Standard Chartered Plc. Sir Patrick Gillam Exec
Standard Chartered Plc. G S Talwar Exec
Standard Chartered Plc. P N Kenny Exec
Standard Chartered Plc. The Rt Hon Lord Stewartby RD Non-Exec Yes
Standard Chartered Plc. C N A Castleman Exec
Standard Chartered Plc. E M Davies Exec
Standard Chartered Plc. K S Nargolwala Exec
Standard Chartered Plc. C A Keljik Exec
Standard Chartered Plc. M DeNoma Exec
Standard Chartered Plc. D G Moir Non-Exec
Standard Chartered Plc. A W P Stenham Non-Exec Yes
Standard Chartered Plc. R C Chan Non-Exec
Standard Chartered Plc. H E Norton Non-Exec Yes
Standard Chartered Plc. K A V Mackrell Non-Exec
Standard Chartered Plc. H KwonPing Non-Exec
Standard Chartered Plc. Sir C Chow Non-Exec Yes
Standard Chartered Plc. Sir Ralph Robins Non-Exec Yes
Standard Chartered Plc. B Clare Non-Exec Yes
Table 2: The Ownership of Firms
Company name Shareholder Ownership Clients
Marks and Spencer Plc. Franklin Resources Inc 5.89 40
Marks and Spencer Plc. Brandes Investment Partners 4.319 17
Standard Chartered Plc. CGNU Plc. 3.026 184
Standard Chartered Plc. Prudential Corporation Plc. 4.725 137
Standard Chartered Plc. Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat 13.994 1
Standard Chartered Plc. Scottish Widows 3.003 71
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Pairs-Shortest-Path algorithm. In the context of boards, the term L measures the number of steps
in a chain of shared directors that it takes to get from a source board to a target board.
The second property of the small-world model is high ‘clustering’. This is the propensity for
one’s network neighbors to be neighbors in their own right. It is a measure of network density.
Following Newman et al. (2001) we calculate the following clustering coefficient for the graph as a
whole:
C =
3× (number of triangles in the graph)
(number of connected triples)
(2)
where a triangle is a set of three distinct vertices j, k, l in which each vertex is connected to both
the other two. A connected triple is a set of three vertices j, k, l in which j is connected to k and k
is connected to l (though l need not be connected to j). C is also called the transitive closure of
the graph and 0 < C < 1. In our data, a large value of C is a measure of how ‘clubby’ boards
of directors are. When C = 1 everybody is connected to everyone else.
3.1 Random graphs I: Newman, Strogatz and Watts
We have identified the properties of a small-world. Next, one needs to agree on what is meant
by L being ‘small’ and C being ‘large’ in order to deduce the presence of a small-world. A now
standard approach is to compare L and C from real social networks to the numbers one would
expect to measure in randomly-assembled graphs that share some properties with the observed
network.
In their seminal work on random graphs, Erdo˝s and Re´nyi imagined fixing the number of nodes
N and then deciding, at random, independently and with fixed probability p, whether each of the
graph’s N(N − 1)/2 possible edges exist (see Erdo˝s and Re´nyi (1959, 1960)). In such a graph each
vertex can have as many (N − 1) edges—one connecting it to each of the remaining nodes—and in
expectation a fraction p of these will exist, so such a graph has mean degree z = p(N − 1). More







for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N−1} and zero otherwise. Here pk is the probability of finding a node of degree k.
Erdo˝s and Re´nyi were primarily interested in how the qualitative properties of such graphs changed
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as they held the mean degree z constant, but allowed the number of nodes to tend to infinity. In
the limit the degrees of the nodes have a Poisson distribution pk = zke−z/k!. As a shorthand
we will refer to graphs with Poisson degree distributions as Poisson random graphs. Such graphs
have studied extensively (see for example Bolloba´s, 2001) and have been used as the benchmark by
which to compare social networks. For example, see Newman et al. (2001) as well as Davis et al.
(2003), both of whom compare small-world statistics from actual social networks to those expected
for random graphs with a Poisson degree distribution.
More recently, an alternative and more appropriate benchmark was proposed by Newman et al.
(2001, 2002). Newman, Strogatz and Watts (NSW) developed a way to calculate the expected
values of both L and C using the machinery of probability generating functions11. Their approach
takes as its input the two empirical degree sequences—the distribution of board size (number of
seats on the board) and the distribution of workload among directors (the vast majority of whom sit
on only a single board, though a few serve on many more)—and combines them to predict degree
sequences for the board and director projections. Their predictions are large-graph limits for a
certain family of randomly-assembled social networks, but they are in surprisingly good agreement
with empirical data, especially for the distribution of degree in the director projection.
Using the machinery of generating functions one can calculate the expected mean degree, path
length and clustering coefficient for the graph. The degree distribution associates a probability pk
with each possible value of the degree k, where k is any non-negative integer. Such distributions
permit one to construct a probability generating function, G(x), which is a function of one variable




k and it is a general property of generating functions
that G(1) = 1. For generating functions arising from degree distributions the mean degree is given
by: z = 〈k〉 =
∞∑
k=0
kpk = G′(1) Here the angle brackets are the expectation operator. 12
A bipartite graph of either the control network (board-to-director) or the ownership network
(shareholder-to-firm) has two empirical degree distributions. This gives rise to two separate gen-
erating functions. Consider the case of the control network. We denote f0(x) as the function that
generates the degree distribution for the directors (i.e. the distribution of the number of boards
on which a director sits). For concreteness, say that the frequency with which one finds a director
11See Wilf (1990) for a discussion of generating functions.
12Formulae for higher moments of the distribution, as well for the generating functions for sums of independent
samples from distribution are also simply related to G(x). Generating functions arising from empirical degree distri-
butions are finite polynomials.
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serving on j boards is pj.. Then f0(x) is given by f0(x) =
∑
j pjx
j. The second degree distribution
for boards (i.e. the distribution of the number of directors per firm) is given as g0(x). If the




Our real objects of interest are the two projections of the bipartite graph: one whose nodes
are boards and whose edges represent shared directors (the graph showing board interlocks) and
another whose nodes are directors and whose edges connect directors that sit on one (or more)
board in common. The charm of the generating function approach is that it permits one to start
with the empirical generating functions f0(x) and g0(x) and derive expressions for the generating
functions for the degree distributions in the projections. We will refer to these derived distributions
as the theoretical degree distributions to emphasize that they are not measured directly from the
data. Instead, they describe the distribution of degrees one would find in random corporate worlds
constructed by applying the methods of the previous section to the empirical degree distributions.
These theoretical degree distributions are the device by which we obtain expected values of the
small-world statistics without having to generate and analyze random graphs.
Suppose now that we are investigating a corporate world in which N directors sit on M boards.
Suppose further that the mean number of seats on a board is ν and that the mean number of
directorships held is μ. The bipartite graph representing this community has one edge for each seat
on a board and so
νM = (number of seats on boards) = μN.
Define the generating function for theoretical degree distribution of the projection onto directors
as G0(x). We denote the expected degree as 〈z〉, the expected path length as 〈L〉 > and the expected






























The corresponding expressions for the projection whose vertices are boards may be obtained






z = F ′0(1)

















Each quantity in Equation 3 and 4 (i.e. the mean degree, expected path length and clustering
coefficient) can be calculated from the observed data. In the empirical work below we can calculate
these separately for the ownership and control networks. For the control network we use equation
3 for the projection whose vertices are directors and 4 for the projection whose vertices are boards.
Similarly, for the ownership network we can use equation 3 for the projection whose vertices are
shareholders and 4 for the projection whose vertices are firms. Previous empirical work on small-
worlds in the context of corporate governance has used the results of the NSW theory. For example,
Conyon and Muldoon (2006) evaluate whether the board of directors in the UK can be considered
a small-world.
3.2 Random graphs II: Chung and Lu
More recently, Fan Chung and Linyuan Lu have introduced a very convenient and attractive en-
semble of random bipartite graphs that has a prescribed expected degree sequence (Chung and Lu,
2002a,b; Chung et al., 2003). That is, they start with the same ingredients as Newman et al. (2001,
2002), but use them in a different way. Their approach amounts to a sort of probabilistic hiring
hall for corporate leadership: the probability that a given director serves on a given board depends
only on the number of directorships she wants hold and the number of seats on the board. To the
extent that their approach allows one to assemble randomly a corporate network similar to the real
one, Chung and Lu’s model is similar to that of Newman, Strogatz and Watts, but the Chung-Lu
approach is slightly superior as it excludes certain unrealistic kinds of corporate network. For ex-
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Figure 2: Constructing a Chung-Lu random graph: the upper panel shows a small corporate world,
while the lower panel illustrates that stage in construction of a CL-random network which deter-
mines the boards on which director C serves.
1 2 3
A B C D E F G H I J K
1 2 3
A B C D E F G H I J K
d1= 4 d2= 6 d3= 5
dC= 2
ample, almost every graph in the NSW family will include a few cases in which a single director
holds multiple seats on the same board: the Chung-Lu family excludes such examples by design.
Although such anomalous directors will appear only extremely rarely in a given NSW network
(far too rarely to affect such summary statistics as L and C for any realistically-sized corporate
network), it is still appealing to work with a family of random graphs that includes no such cases.
To be concrete, we will illustrate the construction of a board network. Ownership networks can
be similarly fashioned. Imagine that in the original data director A served on dA boards (that is,
she has degree dA in the affiliation network representing the real corporate world) and that board
1 consisted of d1 directors. Then, in a Chung-Lu (CL) random graph, director A would serve on
board 1 with probability









is the total number of edges (or, equivalently, seat on boards) in the original network. This
prescription ensures that, in expectation, each board has the same number of directors and each
director holds the same number of directorships as in the real data.
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To see why, consider Figure 2. The upper panel shows a small corporate world with three
boards and eleven directors: here the total number of edges ρ is 15. The lower panel illustrates
those steps in the construction of a CL random network that determine which edges are incident










Similarly, she serves on board 2 with pC,2 = 12/15 and on board 3 with pC,3 = 10/15. Thus her
expected degree in the random network (the expected number of edges connected to vertex C) is
1× p1,C + 0× (1− p1,C)
+ 1× p2,C + 0× (1− p2,C)
+ 1× p3,C + 0× (1− p3,C) = 1× 815 + 0× 715
+ 1× 1215 + 0× 315
+ 1× 1015 + 0× 515
= 3015 + 0
= 2
More generally, if director C serves on dC boards in the real corporate world then her expected
degree (number of directorships) in a CL-random network is
∑
Boards j













where the final equality follows from Eqn. (6) above. Of course, the same argument works for any
other director and a similar one for any board, so the simple prescription of Eqn. (5) allows us
quickly to generate random graphs whose expected degree sequence matches that of the observed
data.
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3.3 Findings from previous research
There has been a recent upsurge of interest in small-world models and their application to social
networks (Newman, 2003; Jackson, 2005; Watts, 1999; Rowley and Baum, 2007). A comparatively
small number of papers have applied small-world network analysis to the governance and control
of organizations. For example, contemporary work on small-worlds and complex systems includes
Dagnino et al. (2007), Walker (2007) and Cohen et al. (2007). None, to our knowledge, have simul-
taneously examined the ownership and control of firms, or used the types of techniques proposed in
this paper (i.e. Chung-Lu graphs). However, it is important to briefly highlight some of the salient
findings from the extant empirical literature.
In an important early paper Kogut and Walker (2001) examined the small-world ownership
structure of German firms in the mid-1990s. Specifically, the 500 largest non-financial firms, and
50 financial firms. The authors conclude that the ownership structure of German firms can be
characterized as a small-world when compared with an Erdo˝s and Re´nyi (1959) Poisson random
graph. In addition, their simulation results indicate the German small-world is robust to disruption.
The properties of the small-world remain intact even when ownership ties are removed.
In practice, however, the Poisson random graph is not a good description of social networks.
Newman et al. (2001) generalize the random graph model in a number of ways to better understand
the formation of social networks. For example, they consider non-Poisson degree distributions and
the representation of affiliation networks as bipartite graphs. As noted in Section 3 they derive
exact expressions for the degree distribution, the average path-length, and clustering coefficient
within a graph (among other results). They apply the theory to some real-world graphs including
Fortune 1000 company directors. Their analysis shows remarkable agreement between actual data
and the random graph model for some statistics (the clustering coefficient and the average number
of directors on a board) but not others (the number of board interlocks).13
Davis et al. (2003) also examined the network structure of US corporate boards during the 1980s
and 1990s. They examine the small-world properties of directors and companies in each of the years
1982, 1990, and 1999. They find the presence of a small-world among the corporate elite (short
path-lengths and high clustering) when compared with a Poisson random graph. They conclude
that the aggregate connectivity of the social network of boards seems remarkably stable. Such
13Uzzi and Spiro (2005) examined the small-world among collaboration and creativity of artists who produced
Broadway musicals from 1945 to 1989 using Newman et al. (2001) methods.
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connectivity is an intrinsic property of the network. Baum et al. (2003) examined the small-world
of Canadian capital markets, specifically investigating investment bank syndicates. Two banks are
connected if they participated in an underwriting syndicate together. They document the presence
and evolution of a small-world between 1956 and 1989. The Poisson distribution is used as the
benchmark to compare calculated network measures.
Conyon and Muldoon (2006) used techniques developed by Newman et al. (2001) to investigate
the small-world of corporate boards in the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom. They
demonstrated two important findings. First, the network of boards and directors is, in fact, no
smaller than would excepted by chance from a randomly assembled corporate universe. That is
not to say that this is the ‘true’ mechanism by which the corporate world is constructed (that
is absurd) only that the type of random graph models described by Newman et al. (2001) are
remarkably good at predicting the average clustering and path lengths in the network. Second,
Conyon and Muldoon (2006) find, in agreement with the smaller study of Newman et al. (2001),
that there is positive degree correlation in each of the economies studies. That is a tendency for
directors who hold many directorships to sit on boards with other directors who too hold many
directorships. They argue that this is consistent with ‘social homophily effects’ described in the
psychology literature (McPherson et al., 2001).
Our paper tests the predictions arising from the small-world model and contrasts it to the
random-graph alterative hypothesis. It is also important to mention a class of research that inves-
tigates the formation and evolution of social networks by actors involved in a rational cost-benefit
calculus. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) formulate a model where actors incur some costs of main-
taining social ties but also benefits from their location within the resulting dense network of ties.
The cost and benefit functions of the rational link-making actors are parameterized and the subse-
quent equilibrium structures analyzed. See also the related work of Dutta and Mutuswami (1997),
Kim and Wong (2007) and Jackson and Watts (2002). This thematic research is also expanded
in Doreian (2006) who provides an analytical model of the transitions between networks on the
lattices of all graphs with a fixed number of vertices through the addition and deletion of ties. See
also Doreian (2007). Other theoretical research too has examined the formation of networks (see
Jackson (2005)). Cowan and Jonard (2007) analyze the formation of innovation (alliance)networks
using graph theory. In their model, creating an alliance increases the chances of innovation if the
knowledge set of potential partners is complimentary. Since innovation changes the firms knowl-
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edge portfolio so the network evolution changes. They show the structural properties of networks
(degree and clustering) arising from alliance partner choice which is driven by complementarities
in firm’s knowledge portfolios.
In other analytical work related to the themes of our paper Jackson and Rogers (2005) develop
a model where small-worlds arise from the costs and benefits of network formation. In their
model the costs of maintaining a relationship between two actors (e.g. boards) depends on their
proximity to each other. It is relatively easy for near acquaintances to maintain friendships and
form strong bonds. These low costs help explain why one observes high local clustering in the
network. It also explains the presence of short average path lengths. Consider a hypothetical
situation where the network has many densely clustered groups, but the average path length is
high because of the absence of links between the groups. Again, we might think that forming such
a link across groups is, at first sight, costly. However, the absence of links across groups means that
making one such link can provide substantial benefits because it opens up access to many other
agents. Forming a single link can connect one agent to many other agents by reducing the distance
between them and this is exactly what makes that link valuable. This type of research shows that
understanding the underling economic incentives leading to network formation is critical field of
research to complement empirical analyses.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Data
To examine the social network of ownership and control in Britain we used data supplied by
Hemscott (http://www.hemscott.com)14 . Hemscott data has been used in previous corporate gov-
ernance research (e.g. Conyon and Muldoon, 2006). We treat the ownership and board networks as
separate bipartite graphs. In the bipartite graph of firms and owners, the firm represents one set of
vertices and the shareholders the other. In the bipartite graph of firm control, the board represents
one set of vertices and the directors (i.e. the board members) the other—as illustrated in Figure 1.
The board data are snap-shot of all publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange
in 2000. It consists of all executive and non-executive directors at UK public firms (other senior
14Hemscott—Hemmington Scott—is a leading international provider of quality business data, including information
about corporate governance, and investor relations services
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics - UK
N mean p50 p25 p75 min max
The Board
Board size 2055 6.65 6.00 5.00 8.00 2.00 22.00
Boards per director 10,920 1.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 13.00
Ownership
Shareholder per firm 1,932 4.78 4.00 3.00 6.00 1.00 22.00
Firms per shareholder 3,739 2.47 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 184.00
Data Source: Hemscott, 2000
officers are excluded). Likewise, the ownership data consists of firms and their owners, where there
is at least an ownership stake exceeding 3%. We consider only non-board owners in year 2000.
Some basic network statistics on the structure of ownership and control are contained in Table
3. The data set contains 2,055 separate firms and 10,920 unique board members (directors). In
total there are 13,671 director seats—some directors are members of more than one board. The
average board contains approximately seven members and the average British director is a member
of 1.25 boards (including membership of his or her primary board).15 Only a minority of UK board
members hold more than one directorship. Indeed, the director at the 75th percentile still has only
one board position. The maximum number of directorships held by one person is 13.
In the data set we can separately identify a firm and its set of non-board shareholders. The
descriptive statistics are contained in Table 3. We were able to analyze 1,932 unique firms. These
firms have 3,739 separate shareholders. A typical firm has, on average, about five different share-
holders. Conversely, each shareholder owns shares in about 2.5 separate firms. The figure conceals
a very strong skew in the data. There are some shareholders who own shares in many companies.
For example, the shareholder at the 99th percentile holds shares in thirty-one separate firms. One
shareholder (the maximum) owns at least a 3% share stake in 184 firms.
4.2 The small-world of ownership and control
Table 4 presents empirical evidence on the small-world of ownership and control among UK firms
using the methodology of Newman et al. (2001). The hypothesis under investigation: can the real-
15Prior UK research suggests boards are a bit larger than this, but our data includes even the smallest of boards—a
population typically excluded from previous studies. In our data board size is an increasing function of firm size
measured by market capitalization.
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world data be adequately represented by a random-graph with a prescribed degree distribution.
The lower-half of the table contains information on the ‘ownership’ network: the unipartite firm
and owner projections. The upper-half of the table contains information on the ‘control’ network:
the unipartite board and director projections. In each case we report the number of vertices (N),
the number of vertices in the largest connected component (LCC), the degree (D), the average path
length (L), and the clustering coefficient (C). The brackets (<>) are an expectations operator of
the large-graph limits described by Newman et al. (2001).
The data show that the largest connected component is a sizable fraction of the available vertices
in the network (between about 76% and 85%). Even though most directors only have one board
position, the few that have more than one prove to be more than sufficient to link the majority
of corporations together. Similarly, the typical shareholder owns stock in a comparatively small
number of firms. However, the few that own shares in more than one firm are enough to link
together the majority of firms in the data set. In itself, the presence of such a “giant component”16
in the ownership and control network, is a remarkable finding.
The ‘degree’ of a vertex provides one indication of the importance of that actor in the network.
Consider the board network. Table 4 shows that the typical board is connected to about six others—
where connections arise from a shared director. The expected value of the statistic is about six too.
At face value it seems that the real data is in accord with the random-graph model. The board’s
degree is no greater or less than would be expected by chance (but see below). Similarly, the
typical director is connected to about nine others, which, of course, includes members of his or her
own board. Again, there is strong agreement between the actual data and theoretical prediction.
Consider next the ownership network. Table 4 shows that the typical firm is connected to about
one hundred and twenty others (!), where here connectivity arises from a shared owner. Even so,
the actual degree is slightly less than what would be expected by chance given the observed degree
sequences.
Can the network of ownership and control in the UK be characterized as a small-world? Section
3 illustrated that small-worlds are characterized by relatively short path lengths and high clustering.
Consider the path lengths for each of the four projections in Table 4. We observe much agreement
between the actual data and the expected values arising from the NSW method. If anything, the
16The term originated in the work of Erdo˝s and Re´nyi, who proved that if the expected degree z exceeds 1.0 in a
Poisson random graph then, with high probability, the largest connected component contains the majority of vertices.
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Table 4: The small-world of UK ownership and control
N LCC D < D > L < L > C < C >
The Board
Board projection 2,055 1,592 5.686 6.106 5.455 4.078 0.376 0.327
Director projection 10,920 8,323 9.013 9.090 6.275 4.772 0.597 0.544
Ownership
Firm projection 1,932 1,650 120.83 136.181 2.302 1.499 0.519 0.392
Owner projection 3,739 3,029 12.703 15.717 3.226 2.053 0.164 0.041
Data Source: Hemscott, 2000
actual values are slightly greater than the expected. It would, therefore, be tempting to conclude
that path-lengths are really no different from what we would expect from a random graph with
a known degree distribution. The NSW method prompts us to the conclude that the world of
ownership and control is not ‘small’. There are two important observations to make. First, we
would stress that the short-path length outcome is still quite a remarkable finding. The mean
geodesic in any of the projections is a very small fraction of the number of vertices in the largest
connected component. For instance, the mean geodesic (i.e., shortest distance) for the board
projection is about 5.5 whereas the number of vertices is 1,592—or about 0.4% of the vertices in
the largest connected component. Indeed, for the owner projection, the observed geodesic is 3.2
and the number of vertices in the connected component is 3,029 (or about 0.1%). Such short path
lengths can act as important and powerful routes for the spread of business practices, knowledge and
ideas or even rumors (Cowan and Jonard, 2004).17 Second, the procedure advocated by Newman
et al. (2001) only permits us to compare the real-world data to the expected value of the large-graph
limit. We do not have any confidence bounds, for example, to compare to our calculated statistic.
The Chung and Lu (2002a,b) method, on the other hand, permits us to simulate many random
corporate worlds with a prescribed degree sequence. The outcome of the simulations gives us a
range of values on the small-world statistics which we can compare the actual values to.
The NSW clustering coefficient results contained in Table 4 show broad agreement between
actual and expected values for the board of director graphs, but not the ownership networks. For
the board projection C takes a value of 0.376 which is similar to the expected value (= 0.327). The
director projection reveals a qualitatively similar result. The NSW analysis leads us to conclude
17For a Poisson random graph the mean geodesic can be expressed as l = log(N)/ log(z). In the case of the board
projection this is approximately l = log(1, 592)/ log(6.65) = 3.324. The Poisson random graph, like the random graph
with a constrained degree distribution, predicts a short mean geodesic relative to the number of vertices.
22
that boards are not particularly cliquish. In contrast, the clustering coefficient in the ownership
network is greater than expected suggesting that ownership ties are more ‘clubby’ than expected
by chance. For instance, in the firm projection of the ownership network C takes a value of
0.519 which is greater than expected (=0.392). A more pronounced conclusion is observed for the
ownership projection.
4.3 Chung-Lu simulation results
The results so far pertain to actual small-world statistics compared to their expected values using
the machinery introduced by Newman et al. (2001). As noted their predictions are large-graph
limits for a certain ensemble of randomly-assembled social networks. Unfortunately, the procedure
does not permit us to say anything about the confidence intervals within which actual small-world
values lie. To determine whether the world of UK ownership and control really is ‘small’ we
simulated a set of corporate universes with a prescribed expected degree sequence. We followed the
methods introduced by Chung and Lu (2002a,b); Chung et al. (2003). Again, the main hypothesis
under investigation is whether the actual data can be adequately represented by a random-graph
with a prescribed degree distribution. The results of the simulations are plotted in Figures 3 and
4.
Consider Figure 3 which relates to the board of directors (corporate control). The upper row
contains information from the board projection, whereas the lower row pertains to the director
projection. Three network statistics are presented: the average degree (D), the path length (L) and
the clustering coefficient (C). In addition, the frequency distribution arising from the CL random
graph simulations are given. We also report the actual and NSW expected values of each statistic.
Consider the board projection. The calculated values of the degree, path length and clustering
measures each lie outside the range predicted by the Chung-Lu simulations. A Mann-Whitney test
confirmed this. For example, H0 : pr(CL clustering = actual clustering) yielded z = −1.729 with
Prob > |z| = 0.0839. The results are qualitatively similar for the director projection. Once again
the calculated actual degree, path-length and clustering measures lie outside the range predicted
by the Chung-Lu random graph model. In both projections we find that the actual path lengths
are longer than expected by chance. However, we find that clustering is significantly greater than
predicted by the Chung-Lu random-graph model. We deduce that the world of the corporate elite
is ‘small’ in the sense that it is more ‘clubby’ or ‘cliquish’ than would be expected by chance. These
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Small−world of UK boards
empirical results suggest the presence of additional social structure in the network of board control
that is not accounted for by the random-graph model.
Figure 4 relates to the small-world of UK company ownership. The upper-row contains infor-
mation from the firm projection, whereas the lower-row pertains to the owner projection. The
format of Figure 4 is the same as in Figure 3. In the firm projection the average degree is not
significantly different from that expected in a Chung-Lu random graph with prescribed degree se-
quence. [Mann-Whitney H0 : pr(CL degree = actual degree) z = 1.169 with Prob > |z| = 0.2426].
This is not the case in the owner projection, where the actual degree is less that predicted by the
Chung-Lu simulations. The small-world statistics are both very different from that predicted by the
random-graph model. In both the firm and owner projections the path-lengths (L) are significantly
longer than that predicted by the Chung-Lu random graph model. In this sense the world is not
‘small’: path-lengths are not shorter than expected by chance. On the other hand the clustering
coefficient (C) is significantly greater than expected by the random-graph model. Once again, we
deduce that the world of corporate ownership is ‘small’ but only in the sense that it is more ‘clubby’
or ‘cliquish’ than would be expected by chance. Firms are connected to other firms by means of a
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Small−world of UK ownership
common shareholder more frequently than one would expect by chance. Again, the data suggests
the presence of additional social structure in the ownership network that is not accounted for by
the random-graph model.
4.4 Financial institutions and the small-world
Previous research has argued persuasively that financial institutions such as banks are crucial
to understanding the topology of the corporate board network. Sociological research, inspired by
Brandeis (1914) and Mills (1956), has argued that bankers may be appointed to boards as a way for
financial institutions to exercise power and influence over non-financial institutions. An alternative
perspective is that both financial and non-financial institutions receive cross-fertilization benefits
by adding directors of each type to their respective boards. For example, see the analysis of the
formation of the inner circle by Useem (1984). Davis et al. (2003) concluded: ‘we can derive
two main conjectures regarding the underpinnings of the elite network. On the one hand, several
authors point to the central importance of banks in ordering, or even creating, the network. In
this view, the fact that the corporate elite is well-connected results from the presence of particular
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Table 5: The small-world of corporate boards: including and excluding financial institutions
N LCC D < D > L < L > C < C >
All firms
Board projection 2,055 1,592 5.686 6.106 5.455 4.078 0.376 0.327
Director projection 10,920 8,323 9.013 9.090 6.275 4.772 0.597 0.544
Non-financials
Board projection 1,398 761 3.806 3.961 6.565 4.863 0.341 0.278
Director projection 8,503 4,846 9.201 9.237 7.166 5.601 0.679 0.665
Data Source: Hemscott, 2000
institutions at the core, acting as a switchboard connecting disparate directors. In contrast, others
emphasize the unplanned nature of the network: members of the corporate elite all seem to know
one another simply as an unintended consequence of increasing economic concentration.’ Davis
et al. (2003) present empirical evidence from the US showing that during the 1960s and 1980s
the most highly connected organizations were indeed banks. However, they also note that bank
centrality seems to have eroded at the turn of the century.
To test the importance of financial institutions in the corporate network we conducted a very
simple experiment. First, we took the list of firms and directors in the board network described
in sub-section 4.1 (call these ‘All firms’). We then excluded banks, financial institutions and
investment trusts from our initial list of firms yielding a new network (call this new graph ‘Non-
financial institutions’). We then re-calculated the graph statistics presented in Section 4. If financial
institutions are like non-financial institutions then their removal would have little effect on the
network measures. Conversely, if financial institutions are ‘at the core, acting as a switchboard
connecting disparate directors’ then we might expect to observe salient differences between the
original ‘All firms’ board graph and the one without financial institutions.18
In Table 5 we present empirical evidence based on a comparison of calculated network statistics
to Newman et al. (2001) expected values. The upper-half replicates the board network results in
Table 4. The lower-half contains evidence based on the graph which excludes financial institutions.
Disrupting the original network, by removing financial institutions, has a number of consequences.
In the board-projection the mean degree is smaller, the average path-length is longer and the
18The analysis compares ‘Non-Financial’ firms to the larger set of ‘All Firms’. One might instead compare the
Non-Financial network to one (or a group) derived from the full ‘All Firms’ network but deleting randomly-selected
firms to make the new set of ‘All Firms’ network contain the same number of firms as the ‘Non-Financial’ network.
We leave this possibility for future research.
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Figure 5: The UK Board Network : Chung-Lu random graphs: 500 simulations. Analysis on all






























































Small−world of the UK corporate elite
mean clustering-coefficient is smaller. In the director projection we find the mean degree is slightly
greater, the average path-length is longer and the mean clustering-coefficient is greater.
We next simulated a set of corporate universes with a prescribed expected degree sequence using
Chung and Lu (2002a,b); Chung et al. (2003) methods. We did so for the network of all firms and
then separately for the network of non-financial institutions (namely, those firms in the original
graph excluding banks, investment trusts, etc.). The principal hypothesis under investigation is
that the network statistics arising from the simulations are the same for both graphs. If banks and
financial institutions are key to the network we would expect to reject this hypothesis. The results
of the simulations are plotted in Figure 5. The maintained hypothesis is rejected: network topology
is influenced by the presence (or absence) of financial institutions. Consider the board projection.
The network of non-financial firms has a smaller mean degree, longer average path-length and
smaller mean clustering-coefficient. In the director projection, the non-financial network of firms
has a lower mean degree, longer average path-length, and greater mean clustering-coefficient. The
differences in the simulated network-statistics between the ‘All Firm’ graph and the ‘Non-Financial
Firms’ network are all significant based on a Mann-Whitney U test. For example in the board
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projection, H0 : pr(Clustering in all firms = clustering in non-financial firms) yielded z = 27.274
with Prob > |z| = 0.000. We conclude that financial institutions are important and give rise to
different network topologies. Specifically, in the board graph, the exclusion of finance institutions
leads to lower network connectivity (smaller degree), longer path lengths and networks that are
less ‘clubby’ (lower clustering coefficient). Our research complements recent research by Neuman
et al. (2007) who analyze the relations among bank mergers, changes in boards and their networks.
They find that ‘while the largest banks have become even larger through mergers, their boards
have stayed roughly the same size with the same pattern of connections, leaving banks relatively
less central in the intercorporate network. And while global banks previously had more globally-
oriented boards, this is no longer the case, as the link between board networks and strategy has
become more tenuous.’
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a social network analysis of the ownership and control of Anglo-
Saxon firms. Our paper contributes to an emergent literature which is trying to understand social
networks by appealing to a class of small-world models (Newman, 2003; Jackson, 2005). Our paper
makes the following contributions to extant corporate governance research. First, we argue that a
network approach to understanding the ownership and control of firms is relevant and germane. It
complements the canonical agency model, which typically ignores connections between firms. Such
links promote the rapid diffusion of knowledge and ideas through the corporate network (Cowan
and Jonard, 2004).
Second, our research paper addressed the question: can the social network structure of own-
ership and control be characterized as a ‘small-world’? As we noted, a small-world occurs when
‘path-lengths’ are relatively short and ‘clustering’ is relatively high. However, to answer this ques-
tion satisfactorily one needs to address the associated question: how ‘small’ do we expect that
world to be? Simply calculating actual small-world measures alone does not tell us much as we still
need to decide on an appropriate benchmark. An innovation contained in this paper is to compare
the actual social network of ownership and control with an ensemble of random-graphs introduced
by Chung and Lu (2002a,b); Chung et al. (2003). As such, our paper continues a stream of research
that is informed by developments in graph theory and the structure of complex networks—especially
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the important contributions by Newman (2003) and Newman et al. (2001, 2002).
To investigate the ownership and control network of Anglo-Saxon firms we used year 2000
data on British firms. Our analysis revealed a number of empirical findings. We confirmed the
well-known fact that ownership of UK publicly traded firms is diffuse. Firms are owned by many
shareholders, each of whom owns a relatively small share-stake. Our principal findings are: first, in
general the Chung-Lu random-graph model is not particularly well-suited to describing the own-
ership and control of British firms. Our simulations suggest measurable and significant differences
between the actual data and theoretical predictions. This strongly suggests the presence of addi-
tional social structure in the network of ownership and control that is not accounted for by the
random graph model. Only in some cases did we find that the random-graph model seemed to
predict with great accuracy the behavior of the real world.
Second, we find important evidence suggesting that the world of UK ownership and control
is, indeed, ‘small’. It is small in the sense that the measured path-lengths in both the ownership
and board projections are small compared with the number of available vertices in the largest
connected component. However, the statistical evidence suggests that these path-lengths are ac-
tually not smaller than would be expected in a randomly-assembled corporate universe with the
prescribed degree sequence. On the other hand we do find that the ownership and control network
is decidedly more ‘clubby’ or ‘cliquish’ than would be expected by chance. Generally, we found
that the clustering measures in both the ownership and board graphs were greater than predicted
by the Chung and Lu (2002a,b); Chung et al. (2003) random-graph model. Boards tend to be
connected to other boards by a shared director more frequently than one would observe by chance.
In addition, firms are connected to other firms by means of a common shareholder more frequently
than one would expect by chance. There is important social structure in the network that is yet
to be accounted for. It is in this context that analytical research is important. If the corporate
world is not easily represented as a random-graph, then future research needs to focus on alterna-
tive explanations of the observed network structure. A potentially fruitful avenue is the class of
theoretical small-world models recently analyzed by Jackson (2005) and Jackson and Rogers (2005)
and other analytical research such as Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Dutta and Mutuswami (1997),
Kim and Wong (2007) and Jackson and Watts (2002).
Finally, we extended our empirical analysis to examine the properties of the board network
when financial institutions are excluded. Previous research has argued that banks are important
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conduits creating connectivity in corporate networks. In our experiment we concluded that financial
institutions are indeed important and give rise to different network topologies. Specifically, we found
in the board graph that the exclusion of finance institutions leads to lower network connectivity
(a smaller degree was observed), longer path lengths and networks that are less ‘clubby’ (there
was a lower clustering coefficient). Our results suggest the need for further research to examine
the sensitivity of network statistics to the inclusion or exclusion of different types of actors in the
network.
Overall, our paper has contributed to the governance literature by presenting a small-world
analysis of the ownership and control of British publicly traded firms. We have done so by using
relevant techniques from computational graph theory (i.e. Chung-Lu graphs). We hope that the
research and results contained in this paper provide a stimulus to future graph theoretic analyses
of corporate governance phenomena.
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